Source note · SIP TLS handshake failures on trunks
RFC 5922 takes a SIP domain identity from the certificate's subjectAltName, either a URI of scheme sip with no userinfo or a DNS name, and permits examining the CN only if no subjectAltName is present.
Checked 2026-09-25
If and only if the subjectAltName does not appear in the certificate, the implementation MAY examine the CN field of the certificate.
- Vendor
- IETF
- Product
- SIP
- Subsystem
- server identity validation
- Deployment
- any
- Region
- not restricted
- Release range
- RFC 5922 (June 2010)
- Checked
- 2026-09-25
Sources
- RFC 5922: Domain Certificates in the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) — RFC Editor / IETF · tier 1 standards and regulators · Section 7.1
Cite this note
APA
WarmTransfer. (2026, September 25). SIP TLS handshake failures on trunks: source note sip-tls-handshake-failures-rfc5922-san-precedence. WarmTransfer. https://warmtransfer.net/knowledge/claims/sip-tls-handshake-failures-rfc5922-san-precedence
BibTeX
@misc{warmtransfer-claim-sip-tls-handshake-failures-rfc5922-san-precedence,
title = {SIP TLS handshake failures on trunks: source note sip-tls-handshake-failures-rfc5922-san-precedence},
author = {{WarmTransfer}},
year = {2026},
url = {https://warmtransfer.net/knowledge/claims/sip-tls-handshake-failures-rfc5922-san-precedence},
note = {Source note sip-tls-handshake-failures-rfc5922-san-precedence, checked 2026-09-25}
}